周二硕博(七):考虑策略消费者行为的供应链合作博弈问题研究之考虑消费者低碳偏好的减排模型

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周二硕博(七):考虑策略消费者行为的供应链合作博弈问题研究之考虑消费者低碳偏好的减排模型

2023-03-10 12:30| 来源: 网络整理| 查看: 265

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今天小编为大家带来硕士论文《考虑碳补贴和低碳偏好的两级供应链减排策略研究》的考虑消费者低碳偏好的减排模型,

欢迎您的用心访问!

本期推文阅读时长大约5分钟,请您耐心阅读。

Share interests, spread happiness, increase knowledge, and leave behind beauty.

Dear you,

this is LearningYard Academy!

Today, Xiaobian brings you the emission reduction models that take into account consumers' low carbon preferences for your master's thesis on "A study of two-level supply chain emission reduction strategies considering carbon subsidies and low carbon preferences”,

welcome your visit carefully!

This tweet will take about 5 minutes to read . Please read it patiently.

内容提要

亲爱的读者大家好,今天小编将从思维导图、精读内容、知识补充三个板块为大家带来硕士论文《考虑碳补贴和低碳偏好的两级供应链减排策略研究》的考虑消费者低碳偏好的减排模型,快来跟随小编一起学习吧!

Hello dear readers, today I will bring you the emission reduction models that take into account consumers' low carbon preferences for your master's thesis on "A study of two-level supply chain emission reduction strategies considering carbon subsidies and low carbon preferences” is conducted in three parts: mind map, intensive reading content and knowledge supplement, Come and follow the editor to learn!

正文

01

思维导图

02

精读内容

第三章分析的模型是考虑消费者低碳偏好的减排模型,在由一个制造商和一个零售商构成的两级供应链系统中,制造商和零售商减排的方式有两种,单独减排和合作减排。通过作者的介绍我们可以了解到,制造商和零售商在单独减排时双方均不对对方构成影响,此时双方的地位平等并且同时对自身的减排量进行决策;当制造商和零售商合作减排时,双方以减排成本分担的方式进行合作,因此二者地位不再平等双方之间存在 Stackelberg博弈,博弈过程由零售商主导、制造商跟随。合作减排时,零售商依据市场信息先对自身减排量和分担率进行决策,在了解到零售商的分担率之后制造商再对减排量进行决策。

The model analysed in Chapter 3 is an emissions reduction model that takes into account consumers' low carbon preferences. In a two-tier supply chain system consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, there are two ways in which the manufacturer and retailer can reduce emissions: individually and in partnership. The author's introduction shows that when a manufacturer and retailer reduce emissions individually, neither has any influence on the other and both are on an equal footing and make decisions about their own emissions reductions; when a manufacturer and retailer reduce emissions collaboratively, they work together on a cost-sharing basis and are therefore no longer on an equal footing. The game is led by the retailer and followed by the manufacturer. In the case of cooperative emission reduction, the retailer makes a decision on its own emission reduction and its share based on market information, and the manufacturer makes a decision on the amount of emission reduction after learning the retailer's share.

接下来作者介绍了本章模型的基本假设和符号说明。

假设1:制造商(m)和零售商(r)在生产经营的同时都能够采取减排措施对碳排放进行控制。

假设2:本文所述减排量均为单位产品的碳减排量。

假设3:本文中的消费者属于价格和碳排放双敏感型。

假设4:产品的市场需求函数公式

假设5:制造商和零售商的边际收益是固定不变的。

假设6:制造商和零售商开展减排活动的成本和单位产品的减排量呈二次关系及公式。

The authors next present the basic assumptions and notation of the model in this chapter.

Assumption1: Both the manufacturer (m) and the retailer (r) are able to take measures to reduce their carbon emissions while operating their production.

Assumption2: All emission reductions described in this paper are per unit of product carbon reduction.

Hypothesis3: Consumers in this paper are both price and emission sensitive.

Hypothesis4: The market demand function equation of the product

Assumption5: The marginal revenue of manufacturers and retailers is fixed.

Hypothesis6: The cost of emission reduction activities by manufacturers and retailers and the emission reduction per unit of product are quadratically related and Eq.

03

知识补充

上次我们已经学习了碳中和、碳汇和碳排放权,今天我们接着学习碳交易。

Last time we learned about carbon neutrality, carbon sinks and carbon credits, and today we move on to carbon trading.

第一种情况,如果企业减排成本低于碳交易市场价时,企业会选择减排,减排产生的份额可以卖出从而获得盈利;

第二种情况,当企业减排成本高于碳市场价时,会选择在碳市场上向拥有配额的政府、企业、或其他市场主体进行购买,以完成政府下达的减排量目标。若未足量购买配额以覆盖其实际排放量则面临高价罚款。

In the first scenario, if the cost of emission reduction is lower than the market price of carbon trading, the enterprise will choose to reduce emissions and sell its share of the emission reduction to make a profit.

In the second scenario, when the cost of abatement is higher than the market price of carbon, companies will choose to purchase allowances in the carbon market from the government, companies, or other market players that own them in order to meet their government-imposed emission reduction targets. Failure to purchase enough allowances to cover their actual emissions will result in a high penalty.

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参考资料:Deepl翻译

参考文献:刘永超. 考虑碳补贴和低碳偏好的两级供应链减排策略研究[D].郑州大学,2018.



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